Gross Domestic Product of Indonesia - Analysis of Economic Growth

The Asian Financial Crisis allowed Indonesia a restart by building governance on democratic principles with a focus on prudent fiscal policies and establishing authorities, such as Bank Indonesia, the Financial Services Authority (OJK), and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), capable of monitoring money flows within the country (including the private sector's foreign debt). This significantly strengthened the fundamentals of the Indonesian economy as well as confidence in the stability of the Indonesian economy.

Indeed, Indonesia managed to weather the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 successfully thanks to stronger fiscal, financial and economic foundations in combination with the massive domestic market (a true consumer force).

However, in 2020, another major crisis broke out: the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis. This was a truly unprecedented crisis that caught the world by surprise, causing the complete collapse of consumption (including tourism), production, investment, and trade (due to government policies in an effort to curb the spread of the virus). Indonesia, which had just graduated from 'lower-middle income country' to 'upper-middle income country' with gross national income (GNI) per capita at USD $4,050 in 2019, fell back into the category of 'lower-middle income countries' after four straight quarters of negative economic growth between Q2-2020 and Q1-2021.

The COVID-19 crisis was significantly more severe because (unlike the 2007-2008 global financial crisis) Indonesia could not rely on its domestic consumer force as social and business restrictions caused consumption and production to plunge throughout Indonesian society. Fortunately, recovery from the COVID-19 crisis started in 2021 and proceeded at a rapid pace. And, again, economic recovery was sped up thanks to skyrocketing global commodity prices (Indonesia being a key palm oil and coal exporter).

Overview of Our Analysis

We divide Indonesia's recent economic history into a couple of chapters (an overview can be seen in Table 1). Below, we discuss these chapters in more detail.

Table 1; Chapters in Indonesia's Recent Economic History:

Years	Average Annual GDP Growth (%)	Period
1967 – 1997	6.85	Suharto's New Order
1998 – 1999	-6.65	Asian Financial Crisis
2000 – 2004	4.60	Recovery
2005 – 2011	5.80	2000s Commodities Boom
2011 – 2015	5.53	Slowing Economic Growth
2015 – 2019	5.03	Stabilizing Economic Growth
2020 – 2021	-2.92         (Q2/2020 - Q1/2021)	COVID-19 Crisis
2021 – 2022	5.16	Recovery
2023 – present		Slowing Economic Growth

_{The layout of this table might be distorted on smaller devices}

Chapter I (1967-1997): Impressive Growth Under Suharto's New Order

Suharto's New Order era (1967-1998) witnessed a remarkable economic transformation in Indonesia, often dubbed an "economic miracle". Inheriting a struggling economy plagued by hyperinflation, Suharto's government, advised by US-trained technocrats, prioritized economic stability and growth.

Initial policies focused on reintegrating Indonesia into the global economy, rejoining international financial institutions, and attracting foreign aid and investment through laws like the Foreign and Domestic Investment Laws (1967-1968). This led to significant capital inflows and double-digit growth in the early years.

The 1970s oil booms provided substantial revenue, allowing the government to increase public investment in infrastructure, social development, and basic industries, fostering a nascent manufacturing sector. While this period saw rapid economic growth (averaging almost 7 percent annually), it also led to some resentment over the perceived dominance of foreign investment and Chinese-Indonesian businesses, prompting the introduction of policies favoring indigenous entrepreneurs.

By the early 1990s, Indonesia was lauded as an "Asian Tiger" by the World Bank. Poverty rates drastically reduced, and social indicators improved. However, the system became increasingly characterized by cronyism and nepotism, with Suharto's family and close associates accumulating vast wealth and controlling key economic sectors. This underlying weakness, coupled with inadequate financial management, made Indonesia particularly vulnerable to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which ultimately triggered the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998.

Chart A; Indonesia’s GDP Growth Rate 1967-1997:

Chart A reveals significant volatility in Indonesia's GDP growth rate between 1967 and 1989. However, this volatile trend is followed by much more consistent GDP growth after 1988 (with the exception of 1997 when the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis started to be felt).

This trend highlights the emergence of Indonesia's middle class (which turned into a huge consumer force after two decades of strong national economic growth). This made Indonesia's GDP growth much more consistent and stable after 1988, while at the same time making Indonesia less reliant on volatile commodity price swings on international markets. However, despite becoming less volatile on a year-on-year (y/y) basis, commodity prices do still influence the longer term trends of Indonesia's GDP (as we discuss below).

Chapter II (1997-1998): Asian Financial Crisis

A detailed analysis of the origins, impact, and consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia is available in another section of this website. Therefore, only a brief overview is provided here.

Indonesia faced a devastating economic crisis during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, largely due to a fragile banking sector and substantial unhedged foreign debt. The crisis began with the rupiah experiencing a drastic devaluation, plummeting from around IDR 2,400 per US dollar in December 1996 to IDR 16,000 per US dollar by January 1998.

This sharp depreciation crippled businesses with dollar-denominated debts, leading to widespread bankruptcies and a severe credit crunch. The banking sector, already weakened by poor oversight, suffered widespread bank runs; inflation soared to 65 percent in 1998, and unemployment surged. Poverty rates nearly doubled, exacerbating social unrest and culminating in the resignation of President Suharto. Despite an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout, the initial policy responses intensified the panic, highlighting the deep-seated issues within Indonesia's financial system.

Chapter III (1999-2011): Recovery and 2000s Commodities Boom

Although seperated in Table 1, we put the recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis and the 2000s commodities boom together in chapter III, as high commodity prices significantly sped up Indonesia's economic recovery from the crisis.

In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, roughly between the years 1999 and 2004, Indonesia experienced a period of economic recovery with an average GDP growth rate of 4.6 percent per year. Hereafter, Indonesia's GDP growth accelerated (with the exception of 2009 when, amid global financial turmoil, uncertainty and massive capital outflows, Indonesia's GDP growth was somewhat subdued, although Indonesia was one of the few G20 economies to experience positive growth in 2009).

This period of recovery and impressive, accelerating economic growth between 2000 and 2011 can be attributed to several factors:

(1) Growing household consumption (amid rapidly strengthening per capita GDP and purchasing power), allowing household consumption to become the dominant cornerstone of the Indonesian economy. Moreover, a relatively young and growing labor force, with a low dependency ratio, was another positive factor for economic growth;

(2) The 2000s commodities boom generated substantial foreign exchange earnings, as Indonesia is a significant exporter of coal, palm oil, and natural gas (LNG);

(3) Having learned valuable lessons during the crisis, prudent macroeconomic management and structural reforms (including fiscal decentralization) were implemented by the Indonesian government and Bank Indonesia to stabilize inflation, rebuild international reserves, and significantly reduce public and private indebtedness. This improved financial stability and led to better credit ratings.

It is worth zooming in a bit further on the strong correlation between swings in commodity prices and trends in Indonesia's household consumption. In essence, when commodity prices rise, household consumption improves. The good export performance generates significantly more revenue for the country, which can translate into higher incomes for businesses involved in commodity production, increased government revenue (through taxes and royalties, which can be spent on social assistance programs or infrastructure development), and ultimately, higher wages or profits for individuals working in or linked to these sectors.

Meanwhile, there is also the trickle-down effect, as the increased income from commodity exports can stimulate economic activity across various sectors. Companies expand, hire more people, and increase investment, leading to a "trickle-down" effect that boosts overall household income and purchasing power.

Conversely, when commodity prices are structurally declining for a prolonged period, then Indonesia's household consumption experiences slowdowns (reflecting the inverse of the developments described in the preceding two paragraphs).

Chart B; Indonesia’s GDP Growth Rate 1997-2011:

Chapter IV (2011-2015): Slowing Economic Growth

Easing commodity prices marked the end of the 2000s commodities boom. The slowing Chinese economy was a crucial factor. Though China's GDP growth rates remained impressive, they had begun to decline from double-digit figures in the mid-2000s. Therefore, China's appetite for commodities also moderated.

In 2010, China began to shift its economic growth model (which previously relied on investment and exports) to a model that depends on private consumption, services and innovation. This is a shift that requires time and effort.

Meanwhile, a rapidly aging Chinese population, a declining birth rate, a US Federal Reserve that was increasingly normalizing and tightening monetary policy between 2013-2019, and the slowing global economy also curbed China's economic momentum. In addition, China's economy was also affected by stringent regulations on debt and certain types of risky loans, which subsequently triggered a sharp slowdown in investment in China.

The slowdown in economic expansion in China had a direct impact on Indonesia because the two countries are important trading partners (China accounts for almost one tenth of Indonesia's total exports). It is estimated that for every 1 percent decline in Chinese GDP growth, Indonesia's economic expansion decreases by around 0.1-0.3 percent. So, the structural decline in China's economic growth certainly contributed to the structural decline in Indonesia's economic growth in the first half of the 2010s.

Global commodity prices, which had fueled Indonesia's robust growth in the 2000s, began a sustained decline after 2011. As a major exporter of coal, palm oil, and other natural resources, Indonesia's export revenues were severely impacted. This led to reduced foreign exchange earnings, lower corporate profits in commodity-related sectors, and less government revenue from taxes and royalties. Provinces heavily reliant on mining and agriculture experienced significant slowdowns or even contractions.

As described above, the sustained decline in global commodity prices also undermined domestic consumption across Indonesia (although domestic consumption did continue to be the main engine of economic growth for Indonesia). Meanwhile, subsidized fuel reforms in 2013 and 2014 triggered inflationary pressures. These were much-needed decisions to improve the health of the state budget but they did put further pressure on people's purchasing power.

The private sector, particularly in manufacturing, remained hesitant to invest due to various structural bottlenecks including a less-than-ideal investment and business environment and an over-reliance on commodity-led growth during the boom years.

Meanwhile, high interest rates curb credit growth, and thus curb economic growth. Starting in mid-2013, the central bank of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) raised its benchmark interest rate gradually, yet firmly, from a low of 5.75 percent to 7.75 percent at the end of 2014. Bank Indonesia decided to tighten its monetary policy in order to combat high inflation (which had risen sharply after several fuel subsidy reforms), ease pressures on the country's widening current account deficit, and support the rupiah rate, which had come under heavy pressure from mid-2013 due to monetary tightening in the United States (known as the 'taper tantrum', referring to the 2013 collective reactionary panic that triggered a spike in US treasury yields after investors learned that the Federal Reserve was slowly putting the brakes on its quantitative easing program).

Massive capital outflows from developing countries, including Indonesia, occurred throughout most of 2013 as the US Federal Reserve hinted at winding down its USD $85 billion monthly bond purchasing program (US quantitative easing). In 2015, these capital outflows from developing countries reappeared because the world started to prepare for higher US interest rates (Federal Funds Rate). In December 2015, the Federal Reserve raised its key rate for the first time in almost a decade, from the range of 0.0-0.25 percent to 0.25-0.50 percent.

Politics is also considered a factor as 2014 was a big 'political year' for Indonesia due to the legislative and presidential elections. The presidential election was a battle between Joko Widodo, supported by the PDI-P party, who was also the market favorite due to the reform-minded nature he showed as mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta. His opponent was Prabowo Subianto, supported by Gerindra. Subianto is a controversial former army general who was also former President Suharto's son-in-law. Although initially this 2014 election was believed to become an easy victory for Widodo, the presidential election ultimately proved to be a fierce and close battle (eventually requiring a decision by the Constitutional Court to confirm the outcome). As a consequence of the high degree of political uncertainty in the context of the 2014 elections (after the decade-long Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency), investment was disrupted for about five months in 2014, contributing to the further slowdown of the Indonesian economy.

Given Indonesia's status as a young democracy, its highly diverse society, and the presence of numerous swing voters (i.e., individuals not consistently loyal to one political party), there is always a chance to see a big surprise in elections. Therefore, elections in Indonesia always give rise to a (high) degree of uncertainty. And, if there is one thing investors dislike, it is uncertainty.

Chapter V (2015-2019): Stabilizing Economic Growth

In late 2014 Joko Widodo became Indonesia's seventh President. A cornerstone of his philosophy was the implementation of structural reforms (which Indonesia had not seen since the fall of Suharto when Indonesia transformed from a centralized authoritarian regime into a decentralized democracy).

Widodo's reform agenda included massive infrastructure development. Large-scale investments in (toll) roads, ports, airports, power plants, and other critical infrastructure projects significantly boosted the construction sector, created jobs, and improved connectivity across the archipelago (partly funded by diverting substantial funds from fuel subsidies to infrastructure spending). This was seen as crucial for improving productivity and competitiveness, and for distributing economic activity beyond Java.

Analysts were very pleased to see Widodo's decision to cut spending on subsidized energy. Many had criticized Indonesia's ballooning energy subsidy spending because it was considered misdirected (failing to support the poor) and prevented heavy government spending on productive matters (such as social development and infrastructure). This decision also helped Indonesia to obtain investment grade ratings from the three major credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, and Fitch Group), thereby unlocking a new pool of capital inflows.

Furthermore, Widodo aimed to reduce Indonesia's traditional dependence on exports of raw commodities by encouraging investment in smelting facilities, thereby transforming Indonesia into an exporter of value-added mining products. This strategy sought to make the country less vulnerable to price swings on commodity markets. Notably, the initial steps toward value addition in the mining sector were taken under his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (specifically through Law No. 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining).

Widodo also pushed for legal and regulatory reforms to improve the investment environment in an attempt to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) and stimulate domestic investment. While challenges persisted, the government introduced various economic policy packages and reforms, including streamlining business licensing, tax incentives, and efforts to open up more sectors of the economy. Domestic investment in particular saw a significant increase in some years during this period.

Combined, these efforts managed to stop the slowing economic growth trend of Indonesia that occurred between 2011 and 2015, and instead, helped growth stabilize around the 5.0 percent (y/y) mark. However, while most countries might envy that growth pace, the concern for Indonesia is that growth around 5 percent may be insufficient to generate enough job opportunities for the country's large labor force. Moreover, Indonesia risks falling into the 'middle-income trap' if it fails to structurally secure accelerated economic growth above 5 percent (y/y).

Chart C; Indonesia’s GDP Growth Rate 2011-2019:

Chapter VI (2020-2021): COVID-19 Crisis

After China had already been impacted by the COVID-19 virus in Q4-2019 (causing a decline in investment, trade, and foreign visitor arrivals from China), the first confirmed COVID-19 case in Indonesia was reported towards the end of Q1-2020. Following the examples set abroad, the Indonesian government imposed a series of social and business restrictions (including lockdowns) that heavily undermined consumption, production, travel, trade, and investment.

The Indonesian economy contracted by -2.07 percent (y/y) in 2020, with the deepest contraction seen in Q2-2020 at -5.32 percent (y/y). It marked Indonesia's first recession since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

This severe downturn was primarily driven by plummeting household consumption (amid social mobility restrictions). Considering household consumption accounts for more than half of Indonesian GDP, this had a big impact. However, gross fixed capital formation, along with exports and tourism, also took unprecedented hits (as investment plummeted).

Table 2; Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product Growth per Quarter (annual % change):

Period	2019	2020	2021	2022
Quarter I	+5.06%	+2.97%	-0.69%	+5.02%
Quarter II	+5.05%	-5.32%	+7.08%	+5.46%
Quarter III	+5.01%	-3.49%	+3.53%	+5.73%
Quarter IV	+4.96%	-2.17%	+5.03%	+5.01%
Full Year	+5.02%	-2.07%	+3.70%	+5.31%

^{Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)}

Chapter VII: Recovery from the COVID-19 Crisis

This Section Is Being Updated (!)

But besides allowing the acceleration of Indonesia's economic recovery after the Asian Financial Crisis, the 2000s commodities boom can now also be seen as a time of missed opportunities as the Indonesian government failed to reduce the country's traditional dependency on (exports of raw) commodities. Hence, when commodity prices collapsed after 2011 Indonesia's economic expansion started to slow accordingly. Between 2011 and 2015 a period of worrying economic slowdown emerged, with GDP growth dipping below 5 percent year-on-year (y/y) in 2015. So, in case commodity prices will again experience a supercycle in the 2020s, the Indonesian government should not reduce its focus on encouraging the development of value-added activities this time, while encouraging the integration of Indonesia into the world's (value-added) supply chains (which has remained relatively weak so far). Further improving the investment environment is also crucial as it will attract foreign direct investment that brings valuable new technology and expertise to Indonesia (and tends to integrate Indonesia into the global supply chains in case of export-oriented investment).

Table 3; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Statistics of Indonesia:

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
GDP, Constant (in USD billion)	1,065.7	1,122.3	1,178.9	1,240.0
GDP, Constant (in IDR trillion)	11,120.0	11,710.2	12,301.5	12,920.3
GDP (annual % change)	3.70	5.31	5.05	5.03
GDP per Capita (in USD, constant)	3,851	4,025	4,193	4,368

 

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
GDP, Constant (in billion USD)	820.8	860.8	904.2	950.0	999.2	1,049.3	1,027.7
GDP, Constant (in IDR trillion)	8,564.9	8,982.5	9,434.6	9,912.9	10,425.8	10,949.1	10,723.0
GDP (annual % change)	5.01	4.88	5.03	5.07	5.17	5.02	-2.07
GDP per Capita (in USD, constant)	3,171	3,288	3,417	3,553	3,701	3,851	3,739

 

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
GDP, Constant (in billion USD)	558.3	591.9	619.3	657.8	698.4	740.5	781.7
GDP, Constant (in IDR trillion)				6,864.1	7,287.6	7,727.1	8,156.5
GDP (annual % change)	6.35	6.01	4.63	6.22	6.17	6.03	5.56
GDP per Capita (in USD, constant)	2,355	2,465	2,546	2,671	2,800	2,930	3,055

^{The base year for computing the economic growth rate shifted from 2000 to 2010 in 2014, previous years have been recalculated
Sources: World Bank and Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)}

When taking a look at the tables above one may notice that the global economic downturn brought about by the global financial crisis in the late 2000s had a relatively small impact on the Indonesian economy (compared to the impact it had on other countries). In 2009, Indonesia's GDP growth dropped to +4.6 percent (y/y), which meant that the country was actually among the top GDP growth performers worldwide that year (and the third-highest among the G20 group of major economies).

So, despite severe global turmoil (which led to a big decline in global trade and investment), the economy of Indonesia was still able to grow at an admirable pace in 2009. What was the key to this success?

Well, firstly, one very crucial matter is that Indonesia is not only home to a huge population (the fourth-largest worldwide) but also home to a population that saw its per capita GDP and purchasing power rise sharply throughout the 2000s on the back of the commodities boom and overall economic growth. As a consequence, household consumption now contributes significantly (some 56-58 percent) to the country's total economic growth (a side-effect of high commodity prices was that investment soared). The 2000s commodities boom greatly helped to turn the Indonesian population into an impressive consumer force (particularly thanks to the country's rapidly expanding middle class). Household consumption was a 'cushion' for the Indonesian economy that allowed sustained economic activity at a time when the global economy and global conditions turned sour.

Secondly - and this is a structural weakness of the Indonesian economy - its export and import performance forms only a relatively small percentage of the country's total economy. Indonesia's trade-to-GDP ratio is in fact very low at around 40 percent (far below the world's average of 55-60 percent). This low ratio indicates that Indonesia is poorly integrated into the global supply and value chains. It is a situation that implies missed opportunities in terms of foreign investment (missing out on new technology and expertise that foreign investments tend to bring), new employment opportunities, and - more generally - missed opportunities in terms of economic and social growth.

The only 'advantage' of having a low trade-to-GDP ratio is that the country is not heavily affected by a sudden drop in international trade as happened in 2008-2009 (global financial crisis) and in 2018-2020 (in the context of - first - the United States-China tariff war and - second - the COVID-19 crisis). However, it means that in good trade times, Indonesia is left behind (mainly relying on unprocessed commodities).

So, Indonesia's huge domestic market (Indonesia being home to around 270 million people) and its relative 'immunity' to sudden drops in global trade (as well as drops in foreign investment inflows as foreign investment as a percentage of GDP is also typically weak for Indonesia), means that Indonesia will not see huge contractions in times of global crises. For comparison, Singapore (which is highly dependent on international trade and investment) experienced a 5.8 percent (y/y) economic contraction in 2020 amid the COVID-19 crisis. Indonesia managed to keep the damage at 2.07 percent y/y in that same year).

Indonesia's Middle Class - Engine of Economic Growth

In 2010 the World Bank noted in a report that, amid robust economic growth, around seven million Indonesians were added to the country's middle class, each year. And while the inflow into the country's middle class has been curtailed as economic growth has slowed down, Indonesia still contains a massive consumer force that drives the economy and triggers rising domestic and foreign investment, today. Obviously, investors are eager to invest in a country that has a population of 270 million people (with rising per capita GDP) as it means there exists a huge market for a whole range of products and services, especially on densely-populated Java.

Determining the exact number of middle class Indonesians is a matter of definition. At the start of 2020, the World Bank mentioned that around 52 million Indonesians fall within its middle class category (which roughly equals 20 percent of the total population of Indonesia).

However, other research companies, such as the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), McKinsey, and Oxford Business Group, set a lower bar and thus their number of middle class Indonesians is about two times higher. But all agree that Indonesia's middle class will continue to grow rapidly. And this rapidly increasing number of middle income earners is a huge potential for further (structural) economic growth in the years - and decades - to come.

Already, the Indonesian middle class has been a major driver of economic growth as this group’s consumption has grown about 12 percent, annually, since 2002 and now represents close to half of all household consumption in Indonesia.

Slowing Economic Growth (2011-2015)

Beginning from 2010, Indonesia's annual GDP growth started to ease, and there are several factors that explain this slowdown:

Regulatory and legal uncertainty regarding the government's (economic) policies has been one of the main obstacles in Indonesia's investment environment because it makes investors think twice before deciding to invest in Indonesia (see also the Risk section). For example, in line with the 2009 Mining Law, Indonesia suddenly imposed a ban on the export of mineral ores in January 2014. And while this ban was not immediately implemented in full (as miners could continue exporting mineral seeds if they committed to establishing domestic smelter facilities and paying higher taxes and royalties), and while the objectives of the new policy are good (namely reducing Indonesia's dependence on highly volatile commodity prices), the new law was an example of how uncertain business in Indonesia is (due to sudden changes in regulations). It was actually a violation of miners' contacts.

Another political matter that generally undermines Indonesia's economic expansion is slow and ineffective government spending. Because of red tape (excessive bureaucracy), corruption, and weak coordination and cooperation between government institutions (both at the central and regional levels), government spending is not optimal.

• Stagnating Household Consumption Growth:

Meanwhile, household consumption growth stagnated in Indonesia (see table below) after having accelerated rapidly in the 2000s. Considering household consumption contributes around 56-58 percent to Indonesia's total economic growth, stagnating household consumption growth has a significant and immediate impact on the country's macroeconomic growth: household consumption growth around 5.0 percent (y/y) makes it very hard for Indonesia's overall economic growth to accelerate.

The reason behind stagnant household consumption growth remains somewhat of a mystery and has been confusing analysts and policymakers. However, given that third-party funds in Indonesia's banking sector have grown over the same period, it could indicate that consumer purchasing power did actually not weaken. Instead, Indonesian consumers could be saving their money (on bank accounts), rather than spending it. Some argue that this shows a structural change: the younger generations (millennials) are more aware of the importance of depositing funds in bank accounts, while the older generations of Indonesians lack such awareness. And over time, the role of the younger generations has increased in the Indonesian economy, implying that changes in spending behavior were increasingly felt in the economy.

However, we also want to remind that the end of the 2000s commodities boom in 2011 has undermined Indonesia's per capita GDP growth, implying that household consumption growth could not continue at the same pace.

Table x; GDP of Indonesia – Current Prices (in IDR trillion):

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Quarter I	3,922.6	3,971.2	4,508.6	5,071.5	5,288.5
Quarter II	3,687.7	4,175.9	4,897.9	5,223.4	5,536.5
Quarter III	3,894.7	4,325.4	5,066.9	5,295.0	5,638.9
Quarter IV	3,929.2	4,498.3	5,114.8	5,302.5	5,675.1
Full-Year	15,443.4	16,976.7	19,588.5	20,892.3	22,139.0

^{Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)}

Table x; GDP of Indonesia – Constant Prices 2010 (in IDR trillion):

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Quarter I	2,703.1	2,684.0	2,819.3	2,961.5	3,113.0
Quarter II	2,589.7	2,772.9	2,924.4	3,075.8	3,231.0
Quarter III	2,720.6	2,815.9	2,977.9	3,125.0	3,279.6
Quarter IV	2,709.0	2,846.1	2,988.5	3,139.1	3,296.7
Full-Year	10,723.0	11,120.1	11,710.2	12,301.5	12,920.3

^{Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)}

 

Table x; Year-on-Year Change in Indonesia’s Household Consumption:

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Quarter I			-2.21%	+4.34%	+4.54%	+4.91%
Quarter II			+5.96%	+5.51%	+5.22%	+4.93%
Quarter III			+1.02%	+5.39%	+5.05%	+4.91%
Quarter IV			+3.55%	+4.48%	+4.47%	+4.98%
Full-Year	+5.04%	-2.63%	+2.02%	+4.93%	+4.82%	+4.94%

^{Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)}

 

Table x; Year-on-Year Change in Indonesia’s Gross fixed capital formation

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Quarter I			-0.21%	+4.09%	+2.11%	+3.79%
Quarter II			+7.52%	+3.07%	+4.63%	+4.43%
Quarter III			+3.75%	+4.98%	+5.77%	+5.16%
Quarter IV			+4.49%	+3.33%	+5.02%	+5.03%
Full-Year

^{Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)}

This Section Is Being Updated